/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note */ #ifndef _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H #define _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H /* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be changed from user-level. */ #define issecure_mask(X) … #define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT … /* When set UID 0 has no special privileges. When unset, we support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root executable under compatibility mode. We raise the effective and inheritable bitmasks *of the executable file* if the effective uid of the new process is 0. If the real uid is 0, we raise the effective (legacy) bit of the executable file. */ #define SECURE_NOROOT … #define SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED … #define SECBIT_NOROOT … #define SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED … /* When set, setuid to/from uid 0 does not trigger capability-"fixup". When unset, to provide compatiblility with old programs relying on set*uid to gain/lose privilege, transitions to/from uid 0 cause capabilities to be gained/lost. */ #define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP … #define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED … #define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP … #define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED … /* When set, a process can retain its capabilities even after transitioning to a non-root user (the set-uid fixup suppressed by bit 2). Bit-4 is cleared when a process calls exec(); setting both bit 4 and 5 will create a barrier through exec that no exec()'d child can use this feature again. */ #define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS … #define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED … #define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS … #define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED … /* When set, a process cannot add new capabilities to its ambient set. */ #define SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE … #define SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED … #define SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE … #define SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED … #define SECURE_ALL_BITS … #define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS … #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */
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