// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause) /* * Copyright (C) 2017-2024 Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright Matt Mackall <[email protected]>, 2003, 2004, 2005 * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. All rights reserved. * * This driver produces cryptographically secure pseudorandom data. It is divided * into roughly six sections, each with a section header: * * - Initialization and readiness waiting. * - Fast key erasure RNG, the "crng". * - Entropy accumulation and extraction routines. * - Entropy collection routines. * - Userspace reader/writer interfaces. * - Sysctl interface. * * The high level overview is that there is one input pool, into which * various pieces of data are hashed. Prior to initialization, some of that * data is then "credited" as having a certain number of bits of entropy. * When enough bits of entropy are available, the hash is finalized and * handed as a key to a stream cipher that expands it indefinitely for * various consumers. This key is periodically refreshed as the various * entropy collectors, described below, add data to the input pool. */ #define pr_fmt(fmt) … #include <linux/utsname.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/major.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/fcntl.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/poll.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/blkdev.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/nodemask.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/kthread.h> #include <linux/percpu.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> #include <linux/workqueue.h> #include <linux/irq.h> #include <linux/ratelimit.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/completion.h> #include <linux/uuid.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <linux/suspend.h> #include <linux/siphash.h> #include <linux/sched/isolation.h> #include <crypto/chacha.h> #include <crypto/blake2s.h> #ifdef CONFIG_VDSO_GETRANDOM #include <vdso/getrandom.h> #include <vdso/datapage.h> #include <vdso/vsyscall.h> #endif #include <asm/archrandom.h> #include <asm/processor.h> #include <asm/irq.h> #include <asm/irq_regs.h> #include <asm/io.h> /********************************************************************* * * Initialization and readiness waiting. * * Much of the RNG infrastructure is devoted to various dependencies * being able to wait until the RNG has collected enough entropy and * is ready for safe consumption. * *********************************************************************/ /* * crng_init is protected by base_crng->lock, and only increases * its value (from empty->early->ready). */ static enum { … } crng_init __read_mostly = …; static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(crng_is_ready); #define crng_ready() … /* Various types of waiters for crng_init->CRNG_READY transition. */ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait); static struct fasync_struct *fasync; static ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(random_ready_notifier); /* Control how we warn userspace. */ static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning = …; static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly = … IS_ENABLED(…); module_param_named(ratelimit_disable, ratelimit_disable, int, 0644); MODULE_PARM_DESC(…) …; /* * Returns whether or not the input pool has been seeded and thus guaranteed * to supply cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the * /dev/urandom device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u8, * u16,u32,u64,long} family of functions. * * Returns: true if the input pool has been seeded. * false if the input pool has not been seeded. */ bool rng_is_initialized(void) { … } EXPORT_SYMBOL(…); static void __cold crng_set_ready(struct work_struct *work) { … } /* Used by wait_for_random_bytes(), and considered an entropy collector, below. */ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void); /* * Wait for the input pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom * device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u8,u16,u32,u64, * long} family of functions. Using any of these functions without first * calling this function forfeits the guarantee of security. * * Returns: 0 if the input pool has been seeded. * -ERESTARTSYS if the function was interrupted by a signal. */ int wait_for_random_bytes(void) { … } EXPORT_SYMBOL(…); /* * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the crng is initialised, * or immediately if it already has been. Only use this is you are absolutely * sure it is required. Most users should instead be able to test * `rng_is_initialized()` on demand, or make use of `get_random_bytes_wait()`. */ int __cold execute_with_initialized_rng(struct notifier_block *nb) { … } #define warn_unseeded_randomness() … /********************************************************************* * * Fast key erasure RNG, the "crng". * * These functions expand entropy from the entropy extractor into * long streams for external consumption using the "fast key erasure" * RNG described at <https://blog.cr.yp.to/20170723-random.html>. * * There are a few exported interfaces for use by other drivers: * * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len) * u8 get_random_u8() * u16 get_random_u16() * u32 get_random_u32() * u32 get_random_u32_below(u32 ceil) * u32 get_random_u32_above(u32 floor) * u32 get_random_u32_inclusive(u32 floor, u32 ceil) * u64 get_random_u64() * unsigned long get_random_long() * * These interfaces will return the requested number of random bytes * into the given buffer or as a return value. This is equivalent to * a read from /dev/urandom. The u8, u16, u32, u64, long family of * functions may be higher performance for one-off random integers, * because they do a bit of buffering and do not invoke reseeding * until the buffer is emptied. * *********************************************************************/ enum { … }; static struct { … } base_crng = …; struct crng { … }; static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs) = …; /* * Return the interval until the next reseeding, which is normally * CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL, but during early boot, it is at an interval * proportional to the uptime. */ static unsigned int crng_reseed_interval(void) { … } /* Used by crng_reseed() and crng_make_state() to extract a new seed from the input pool. */ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len); /* This extracts a new crng key from the input pool. */ static void crng_reseed(struct work_struct *work) { … } /* * This generates a ChaCha block using the provided key, and then * immediately overwrites that key with half the block. It returns * the resultant ChaCha state to the user, along with the second * half of the block containing 32 bytes of random data that may * be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32. * * The returned ChaCha state contains within it a copy of the old * key value, at index 4, so the state should always be zeroed out * immediately after using in order to maintain forward secrecy. * If the state cannot be erased in a timely manner, then it is * safer to set the random_data parameter to &chacha_state[4] so * that this function overwrites it before returning. */ static void crng_fast_key_erasure(u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE], u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS], u8 *random_data, size_t random_data_len) { … } /* * This function returns a ChaCha state that you may use for generating * random data. It also returns up to 32 bytes on its own of random data * that may be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32. */ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS], u8 *random_data, size_t random_data_len) { … } static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len) { … } /* * This returns random bytes in arbitrary quantities. The quality of the * random bytes is good as /dev/urandom. In order to ensure that the * randomness provided by this function is okay, the function * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once * at any point prior. */ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len) { … } EXPORT_SYMBOL(…); static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(struct iov_iter *iter) { … } /* * Batched entropy returns random integers. The quality of the random * number is good as /dev/urandom. In order to ensure that the randomness * provided by this function is okay, the function wait_for_random_bytes() * should be called and return 0 at least once at any point prior. */ #define DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(type) … DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(…) DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(…) DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(…) DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(…) u32 __get_random_u32_below(u32 ceil) { … } EXPORT_SYMBOL(…); #ifdef CONFIG_SMP /* * This function is called when the CPU is coming up, with entry * CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE, which comes before CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP. */ int __cold random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu) { … } #endif /********************************************************************** * * Entropy accumulation and extraction routines. * * Callers may add entropy via: * * static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len) * * After which, if added entropy should be credited: * * static void credit_init_bits(size_t bits) * * Finally, extract entropy via: * * static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len) * **********************************************************************/ enum { … }; static struct { … } input_pool = …; static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len) { … } /* * This function adds bytes into the input pool. It does not * update the initialization bit counter; the caller should call * credit_init_bits if this is appropriate. */ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len) { … } /* * This is an HKDF-like construction for using the hashed collected entropy * as a PRF key, that's then expanded block-by-block. */ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len) { … } #define credit_init_bits(bits) … static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits) { … } /********************************************************************** * * Entropy collection routines. * * The following exported functions are used for pushing entropy into * the above entropy accumulation routines: * * void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len); * void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy, bool sleep_after); * void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len); * void add_vmfork_randomness(const void *unique_vm_id, size_t len); * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq); * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value); * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk); * * add_device_randomness() adds data to the input pool that * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot). * This would be things like MAC addresses or serial numbers, or the * read-out of the RTC. This does *not* credit any actual entropy to * the pool, but it initializes the pool to different values for devices * that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy * available to them (particularly common in the embedded world). * * add_hwgenerator_randomness() is for true hardware RNGs, and will credit * entropy as specified by the caller. If the entropy pool is full it will * block until more entropy is needed. * * add_bootloader_randomness() is called by bootloader drivers, such as EFI * and device tree, and credits its input depending on whether or not the * command line option 'random.trust_bootloader'. * * add_vmfork_randomness() adds a unique (but not necessarily secret) ID * representing the current instance of a VM to the pool, without crediting, * and then force-reseeds the crng so that it takes effect immediately. * * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the interrupt timing as random * inputs to the entropy pool. Using the cycle counters and the irq source * as inputs, it feeds the input pool roughly once a second or after 64 * interrupts, crediting 1 bit of entropy for whichever comes first. * * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well * as the event type information from the hardware. * * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek * times are usually fairly consistent. * * The last two routines try to estimate how many bits of entropy * to credit. They do this by keeping track of the first and second * order deltas of the event timings. * **********************************************************************/ static bool trust_cpu __initdata = …; static bool trust_bootloader __initdata = …; static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg) { … } static int __init parse_trust_bootloader(char *arg) { … } early_param(…); early_param(…); static int random_pm_notification(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long action, void *data) { … } static struct notifier_block pm_notifier = …; /* * This is called extremely early, before time keeping functionality is * available, but arch randomness is. Interrupts are not yet enabled. */ void __init random_init_early(const char *command_line) { … } /* * This is called a little bit after the prior function, and now there is * access to timestamps counters. Interrupts are not yet enabled. */ void __init random_init(void) { … } /* * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help * initialize it. * * None of this adds any entropy; it is meant to avoid the problem of * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely * identical devices. */ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len) { … } EXPORT_SYMBOL(…); /* * Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs. Those devices * may produce endless random bits, so this function will sleep for * some amount of time after, if the sleep_after parameter is true. */ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy, bool sleep_after) { … } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(…); /* * Handle random seed passed by bootloader, and credit it depending * on the command line option 'random.trust_bootloader'. */ void __init add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len) { … } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMGENID) static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(vmfork_chain); /* * Handle a new unique VM ID, which is unique, not secret, so we * don't credit it, but we do immediately force a reseed after so * that it's used by the crng posthaste. */ void __cold add_vmfork_randomness(const void *unique_vm_id, size_t len) { … } #if IS_MODULE(CONFIG_VMGENID) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_vmfork_randomness); #endif int __cold register_random_vmfork_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) { … } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(…); int __cold unregister_random_vmfork_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb) { … } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(…); #endif struct fast_pool { … }; static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct timer_list *work); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness) = …; /* * This is [Half]SipHash-1-x, starting from an empty key. Because * the key is fixed, it assumes that its inputs are non-malicious, * and therefore this has no security on its own. s represents the * four-word SipHash state, while v represents a two-word input. */ static void fast_mix(unsigned long s[4], unsigned long v1, unsigned long v2) { … } #ifdef CONFIG_SMP /* * This function is called when the CPU has just come online, with * entry CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE, just after CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE. */ int __cold random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu) { … } #endif static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct timer_list *work) { … } void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) { … } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(…); /* There is one of these per entropy source */ struct timer_rand_state { … }; /* * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool. The * value "num" is also added to the pool; it should somehow describe * the type of event that just happened. */ static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int num) { … } void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value) { … } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(…); #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk) { … } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(…); void __cold rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk) { … } #endif struct entropy_timer_state { … }; /* * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable jump in * the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another CPU, the timer * activity will be touching the stack of the CPU that is generating entropy. * * Note that we don't re-arm the timer in the timer itself - we are happy to be * scheduled away, since that just makes the load more complex, but we do not * want the timer to keep ticking unless the entropy loop is running. * * So the re-arming always happens in the entropy loop itself. */ static void __cold entropy_timer(struct timer_list *timer) { … } /* * If we have an actual cycle counter, see if we can generate enough entropy * with timing noise. */ static void __cold try_to_generate_entropy(void) { … } /********************************************************************** * * Userspace reader/writer interfaces. * * getrandom(2) is the primary modern interface into the RNG and should * be used in preference to anything else. * * Reading from /dev/random has the same functionality as calling * getrandom(2) with flags=0. In earlier versions, however, it had * vastly different semantics and should therefore be avoided, to * prevent backwards compatibility issues. * * Reading from /dev/urandom has the same functionality as calling * getrandom(2) with flags=GRND_INSECURE. Because it does not block * waiting for the RNG to be ready, it should not be used. * * Writing to either /dev/random or /dev/urandom adds entropy to * the input pool but does not credit it. * * Polling on /dev/random indicates when the RNG is initialized, on * the read side, and when it wants new entropy, on the write side. * * Both /dev/random and /dev/urandom have the same set of ioctls for * adding entropy, getting the entropy count, zeroing the count, and * reseeding the crng. * **********************************************************************/ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, ubuf, size_t, len, unsigned int, flags) { … } static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) { … } static ssize_t write_pool_user(struct iov_iter *iter) { … } static ssize_t random_write_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter) { … } static ssize_t urandom_read_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter) { … } static ssize_t random_read_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter) { … } static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { … } static int random_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on) { … } const struct file_operations random_fops = …; const struct file_operations urandom_fops = …; /******************************************************************** * * Sysctl interface. * * These are partly unused legacy knobs with dummy values to not break * userspace and partly still useful things. They are usually accessible * in /proc/sys/kernel/random/ and are as follows: * * - boot_id - a UUID representing the current boot. * * - uuid - a random UUID, different each time the file is read. * * - poolsize - the number of bits of entropy that the input pool can * hold, tied to the POOL_BITS constant. * * - entropy_avail - the number of bits of entropy currently in the * input pool. Always <= poolsize. * * - write_wakeup_threshold - the amount of entropy in the input pool * below which write polls to /dev/random will unblock, requesting * more entropy, tied to the POOL_READY_BITS constant. It is writable * to avoid breaking old userspaces, but writing to it does not * change any behavior of the RNG. * * - urandom_min_reseed_secs - fixed to the value CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL. * It is writable to avoid breaking old userspaces, but writing * to it does not change any behavior of the RNG. * ********************************************************************/ #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL #include <linux/sysctl.h> static int sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed = …; static int sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits = …; static int sysctl_poolsize = …; static u8 sysctl_bootid[UUID_SIZE]; /* * This function is used to return both the bootid UUID, and random * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is, * then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user. */ static int proc_do_uuid(const struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buf, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) { … } /* The same as proc_dointvec, but writes don't change anything. */ static int proc_do_rointvec(const struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buf, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) { … } static struct ctl_table random_table[] = …; /* * random_init() is called before sysctl_init(), * so we cannot call register_sysctl_init() in random_init() */ static int __init random_sysctls_init(void) { … } device_initcall(random_sysctls_init); #endif
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