// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * fs/ext4/verity.c: fs-verity support for ext4 * * Copyright 2019 Google LLC */ /* * Implementation of fsverity_operations for ext4. * * ext4 stores the verity metadata (Merkle tree and fsverity_descriptor) past * the end of the file, starting at the first 64K boundary beyond i_size. This * approach works because (a) verity files are readonly, and (b) pages fully * beyond i_size aren't visible to userspace but can be read/written internally * by ext4 with only some relatively small changes to ext4. This approach * avoids having to depend on the EA_INODE feature and on rearchitecturing * ext4's xattr support to support paging multi-gigabyte xattrs into memory, and * to support encrypting xattrs. Note that the verity metadata *must* be * encrypted when the file is, since it contains hashes of the plaintext data. * * Using a 64K boundary rather than a 4K one keeps things ready for * architectures with 64K pages, and it doesn't necessarily waste space on-disk * since there can be a hole between i_size and the start of the Merkle tree. */ #include <linux/quotaops.h> #include "ext4.h" #include "ext4_extents.h" #include "ext4_jbd2.h" static inline loff_t ext4_verity_metadata_pos(const struct inode *inode) { … } /* * Read some verity metadata from the inode. __vfs_read() can't be used because * we need to read beyond i_size. */ static int pagecache_read(struct inode *inode, void *buf, size_t count, loff_t pos) { … } /* * Write some verity metadata to the inode for FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY. * kernel_write() can't be used because the file descriptor is readonly. */ static int pagecache_write(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, size_t count, loff_t pos) { … } static int ext4_begin_enable_verity(struct file *filp) { … } /* * ext4 stores the verity descriptor beginning on the next filesystem block * boundary after the Merkle tree. Then, the descriptor size is stored in the * last 4 bytes of the last allocated filesystem block --- which is either the * block in which the descriptor ends, or the next block after that if there * weren't at least 4 bytes remaining. * * We can't simply store the descriptor in an xattr because it *must* be * encrypted when ext4 encryption is used, but ext4 encryption doesn't encrypt * xattrs. Also, if the descriptor includes a large signature blob it may be * too large to store in an xattr without the EA_INODE feature. */ static int ext4_write_verity_descriptor(struct inode *inode, const void *desc, size_t desc_size, u64 merkle_tree_size) { … } static int ext4_end_enable_verity(struct file *filp, const void *desc, size_t desc_size, u64 merkle_tree_size) { … } static int ext4_get_verity_descriptor_location(struct inode *inode, size_t *desc_size_ret, u64 *desc_pos_ret) { … } static int ext4_get_verity_descriptor(struct inode *inode, void *buf, size_t buf_size) { … } static struct page *ext4_read_merkle_tree_page(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t index, unsigned long num_ra_pages) { … } static int ext4_write_merkle_tree_block(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, u64 pos, unsigned int size) { … } const struct fsverity_operations ext4_verityops = …;