.. _xml:
XML Processing Modules
======================
.. module:: xml
:synopsis: Package containing XML processing modules
.. sectionauthor:: Christian Heimes <[email protected]>
.. sectionauthor:: Georg Brandl <[email protected]>
**Source code:** :source:`Lib/xml/`
--------------
Python's interfaces for processing XML are grouped in the ``xml`` package.
.. warning::
The XML modules are not secure against erroneous or maliciously
constructed data. If you need to parse untrusted or
unauthenticated data see the :ref:`xml-vulnerabilities` and
:ref:`defusedxml-package` sections.
It is important to note that modules in the :mod:`xml` package require that
there be at least one SAX-compliant XML parser available. The Expat parser is
included with Python, so the :mod:`xml.parsers.expat` module will always be
available.
The documentation for the :mod:`xml.dom` and :mod:`xml.sax` packages are the
definition of the Python bindings for the DOM and SAX interfaces.
The XML handling submodules are:
* :mod:`xml.etree.ElementTree`: the ElementTree API, a simple and lightweight
XML processor
..
* :mod:`xml.dom`: the DOM API definition
* :mod:`xml.dom.minidom`: a minimal DOM implementation
* :mod:`xml.dom.pulldom`: support for building partial DOM trees
..
* :mod:`xml.sax`: SAX2 base classes and convenience functions
* :mod:`xml.parsers.expat`: the Expat parser binding
.. _xml-vulnerabilities:
XML vulnerabilities
-------------------
The XML processing modules are not secure against maliciously constructed data.
An attacker can abuse XML features to carry out denial of service attacks,
access local files, generate network connections to other machines, or
circumvent firewalls.
The following table gives an overview of the known attacks and whether
the various modules are vulnerable to them.
========================= ================== ================== ================== ================== ==================
kind sax etree minidom pulldom xmlrpc
========================= ================== ================== ================== ================== ==================
billion laughs **Vulnerable** (1) **Vulnerable** (1) **Vulnerable** (1) **Vulnerable** (1) **Vulnerable** (1)
quadratic blowup **Vulnerable** (1) **Vulnerable** (1) **Vulnerable** (1) **Vulnerable** (1) **Vulnerable** (1)
external entity expansion Safe (5) Safe (2) Safe (3) Safe (5) Safe (4)
`DTD`_ retrieval Safe (5) Safe Safe Safe (5) Safe
decompression bomb Safe Safe Safe Safe **Vulnerable**
large tokens **Vulnerable** (6) **Vulnerable** (6) **Vulnerable** (6) **Vulnerable** (6) **Vulnerable** (6)
========================= ================== ================== ================== ================== ==================
1. Expat 2.4.1 and newer is not vulnerable to the "billion laughs" and
"quadratic blowup" vulnerabilities. Items still listed as vulnerable due to
potential reliance on system-provided libraries. Check
:const:`!pyexpat.EXPAT_VERSION`.
2. :mod:`xml.etree.ElementTree` doesn't expand external entities and raises a
:exc:`~xml.etree.ElementTree.ParseError` when an entity occurs.
3. :mod:`xml.dom.minidom` doesn't expand external entities and simply returns
the unexpanded entity verbatim.
4. :mod:`xmlrpc.client` doesn't expand external entities and omits them.
5. Since Python 3.7.1, external general entities are no longer processed by
default.
6. Expat 2.6.0 and newer is not vulnerable to denial of service
through quadratic runtime caused by parsing large tokens.
Items still listed as vulnerable due to
potential reliance on system-provided libraries. Check
:const:`!pyexpat.EXPAT_VERSION`.
billion laughs / exponential entity expansion
The `Billion Laughs`_ attack -- also known as exponential entity expansion --
uses multiple levels of nested entities. Each entity refers to another entity
several times, and the final entity definition contains a small string.
The exponential expansion results in several gigabytes of text and
consumes lots of memory and CPU time.
quadratic blowup entity expansion
A quadratic blowup attack is similar to a `Billion Laughs`_ attack; it abuses
entity expansion, too. Instead of nested entities it repeats one large entity
with a couple of thousand chars over and over again. The attack isn't as
efficient as the exponential case but it avoids triggering parser countermeasures
that forbid deeply nested entities.
external entity expansion
Entity declarations can contain more than just text for replacement. They can
also point to external resources or local files. The XML
parser accesses the resource and embeds the content into the XML document.
`DTD`_ retrieval
Some XML libraries like Python's :mod:`xml.dom.pulldom` retrieve document type
definitions from remote or local locations. The feature has similar
implications as the external entity expansion issue.
decompression bomb
Decompression bombs (aka `ZIP bomb`_) apply to all XML libraries
that can parse compressed XML streams such as gzipped HTTP streams or
LZMA-compressed
files. For an attacker it can reduce the amount of transmitted data by three
magnitudes or more.
large tokens
Expat needs to re-parse unfinished tokens; without the protection
introduced in Expat 2.6.0, this can lead to quadratic runtime that can
be used to cause denial of service in the application parsing XML.
The issue is known as :cve:`2023-52425`.
The documentation for :pypi:`defusedxml` on PyPI has further information about
all known attack vectors with examples and references.
.. _defusedxml-package:
The :mod:`!defusedxml` Package
------------------------------
:pypi:`defusedxml` is a pure Python package with modified subclasses of all stdlib
XML parsers that prevent any potentially malicious operation. Use of this
package is recommended for any server code that parses untrusted XML data. The
package also ships with example exploits and extended documentation on more
XML exploits such as XPath injection.
.. _Billion Laughs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billion_laughs
.. _ZIP bomb: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zip_bomb
.. _DTD: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Document_type_definition
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