// RUN: %clang_analyze_cc1 -Wno-format-security -Wno-pointer-to-int-cast \
// RUN: -Wno-incompatible-library-redeclaration -verify %s \
// RUN: -analyzer-checker=optin.taint.GenericTaint \
// RUN: -analyzer-checker=optin.taint.TaintedDiv \
// RUN: -analyzer-checker=core \
// RUN: -analyzer-checker=alpha.security.ArrayBoundV2 \
// RUN: -analyzer-checker=debug.ExprInspection \
// RUN: -analyzer-config \
// RUN: optin.taint.TaintPropagation:Config=%S/Inputs/taint-generic-config.yaml
// RUN: %clang_analyze_cc1 -Wno-format-security -Wno-pointer-to-int-cast \
// RUN: -Wno-incompatible-library-redeclaration -verify %s \
// RUN: -DFILE_IS_STRUCT \
// RUN: -analyzer-checker=optin.taint.GenericTaint \
// RUN: -analyzer-checker=optin.taint.TaintedDiv \
// RUN: -analyzer-checker=core \
// RUN: -analyzer-checker=alpha.security.ArrayBoundV2 \
// RUN: -analyzer-checker=debug.ExprInspection \
// RUN: -analyzer-config \
// RUN: optin.taint.TaintPropagation:Config=%S/Inputs/taint-generic-config.yaml
// RUN: not %clang_analyze_cc1 -verify %s \
// RUN: -analyzer-checker=optin.taint.GenericTaint \
// RUN: -analyzer-config \
// RUN: optin.taint.TaintPropagation:Config=justguessit \
// RUN: 2>&1 | FileCheck %s -check-prefix=CHECK-INVALID-FILE
// CHECK-INVALID-FILE: (frontend): invalid input for checker option
// CHECK-INVALID-FILE-SAME: 'optin.taint.TaintPropagation:Config',
// CHECK-INVALID-FILE-SAME: that expects a valid filename instead of
// CHECK-INVALID-FILE-SAME: 'justguessit'
// RUN: not %clang_analyze_cc1 -verify %s \
// RUN: -analyzer-checker=optin.taint.GenericTaint \
// RUN: -analyzer-config \
// RUN: optin.taint.TaintPropagation:Config=%S/Inputs/taint-generic-config-ill-formed.yaml \
// RUN: 2>&1 | FileCheck -DMSG=%errc_EINVAL %s -check-prefix=CHECK-ILL-FORMED
// CHECK-ILL-FORMED: (frontend): invalid input for checker option
// CHECK-ILL-FORMED-SAME: 'optin.taint.TaintPropagation:Config',
// CHECK-ILL-FORMED-SAME: that expects a valid yaml file: [[MSG]]
// RUN: not %clang_analyze_cc1 -verify %s \
// RUN: -analyzer-checker=optin.taint.GenericTaint \
// RUN: -analyzer-config \
// RUN: optin.taint.TaintPropagation:Config=%S/Inputs/taint-generic-config-invalid-arg.yaml \
// RUN: 2>&1 | FileCheck %s -check-prefix=CHECK-INVALID-ARG
// CHECK-INVALID-ARG: (frontend): invalid input for checker option
// CHECK-INVALID-ARG-SAME: 'optin.taint.TaintPropagation:Config',
// CHECK-INVALID-ARG-SAME: that expects an argument number for propagation
// CHECK-INVALID-ARG-SAME: rules greater or equal to -1
typedef long long rsize_t;
typedef __typeof(sizeof(int)) size_t;
typedef signed long long ssize_t;
typedef __WCHAR_TYPE__ wchar_t;
void clang_analyzer_isTainted_char(char);
void clang_analyzer_isTainted_wchar(wchar_t);
void clang_analyzer_isTainted_charp(char*);
void clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(int);
void clang_analyzer_dump_int(int);
int coin();
int scanf(const char *restrict format, ...);
char *gets(char *str);
char *gets_s(char *str, rsize_t n);
int getchar(void);
typedef struct _FILE FILE;
#ifdef FILE_IS_STRUCT
extern struct _FILE *stdin;
#else
extern FILE *stdin;
#endif
#define bool _Bool
#define NULL (void*)0
wchar_t *fgetws(wchar_t *ws, int n, FILE *stream);
wchar_t *wmemset(wchar_t *wcs, wchar_t wc, unsigned long n);
wchar_t *wmemcpy(wchar_t *dest, const wchar_t *src, size_t n);
wchar_t *wmemmove(wchar_t *dest, const wchar_t *src, size_t n);
size_t wcslen(const wchar_t *s);
wchar_t *wcscpy(wchar_t * dest, const wchar_t * src);
wchar_t *wcsncpy(wchar_t *dest, const wchar_t *src, size_t n);
wchar_t *wcscat(wchar_t *dest, const wchar_t *src);
wchar_t *wcsncat(wchar_t *dest,const wchar_t *src, size_t n);
int swprintf(wchar_t *wcs, size_t maxlen, const wchar_t *format, ...);
char *getenv(const char *name);
FILE *fopen(const char *name, const char *mode);
int fscanf(FILE *restrict stream, const char *restrict format, ...);
int sprintf(char *str, const char *format, ...);
void setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...);
void setproctitle_init(int argc, char *argv[], char *envp[]);
// Define string functions. Use builtin for some of them. They all default to
// the processing in the taint checker.
#define strcpy(dest, src) \
((__builtin_object_size(dest, 0) != -1ULL) \
? __builtin___strcpy_chk (dest, src, __builtin_object_size(dest, 1)) \
: __inline_strcpy_chk(dest, src))
static char *__inline_strcpy_chk (char *dest, const char *src) {
return __builtin___strcpy_chk(dest, src, __builtin_object_size(dest, 1));
}
char *stpcpy(char *restrict s1, const char *restrict s2);
char *strncpy( char * destination, const char * source, size_t num );
char *strndup(const char *s, size_t n);
char *strncat(char *restrict s1, const char *restrict s2, size_t n);
void *malloc(size_t);
void *calloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size);
void bcopy(void *s1, void *s2, size_t n);
// function | pathname | filename | fd | arglist | argv[] | envp[]
// ===============================================================
// 1 execl | X | | | X | |
// 2 execle | X | | | X | | X
// 3 execlp | | X | | X | |
// 4 execv | X | | | | X |
// 5 execve | X | | | | X | X
// 6 execvp | | X | | | X |
// 7 execvpe | | X | | | X | X
// 8 fexecve | | | X | | X | X
// ===============================================================
// letter | | p | f | l | v | e
//
// legend:
// - pathname: rel/abs path to the binary
// - filename: file name searched in PATH to execute the binary
// - fd: accepts a file descriptor
// - arglist: accepts variadic arguments
// - argv: accepts a pointer to array, denoting the new argv
// - envp: accepts a pointer to array, denoting the new envp
int execl(const char *path, const char *arg, ...);
int execle(const char *path, const char *arg, ...);
int execlp(const char *file, const char *arg, ...);
int execv(const char *path, char *const argv[]);
int execve(const char *path, char *const argv[], char *const envp[]);
int execvp(const char *file, char *const argv[]);
int execvpe(const char *file, char *const argv[], char *const envp[]);
int fexecve(int fd, char *const argv[], char *const envp[]);
FILE *popen(const char *command, const char *type);
int pclose(FILE *stream);
int system(const char *command);
typedef size_t socklen_t;
struct sockaddr {
unsigned short sa_family;
char sa_data[14];
};
#define BUFSIZE 10
int Buffer[BUFSIZE];
void bufferScanfDirect(void)
{
int n;
scanf("%d", &n);
Buffer[n] = 1; // expected-warning {{Potential out of bound access }}
}
void bufferScanfArithmetic1(int x) {
int n;
scanf("%d", &n);
int m = (n - 3);
Buffer[m] = 1; // expected-warning {{Potential out of bound access }}
}
void bufferScanfArithmetic2(int x) {
int n;
scanf("%d", &n);
int m = 100 - (n + 3) * x;
Buffer[m] = 1; // expected-warning {{Potential out of bound access }}
}
void bufferScanfAssignment(int x) {
int n;
scanf("%d", &n);
int m;
if (x > 0) {
m = n;
Buffer[m] = 1; // expected-warning {{Potential out of bound access }}
}
}
void scanfArg(void) {
int t = 0;
scanf("%d", t); // expected-warning {{format specifies type 'int *' but the argument has type 'int'}}
}
void bufferGetchar(int x) {
int m = getchar();
Buffer[m] = 1; //expected-warning {{Potential out of bound access}}
}
extern const unsigned short int **__ctype_b_loc (void);
enum { _ISdigit = 2048 };
# define isdigit(c) ((*__ctype_b_loc ())[(int) (c)] & (unsigned short int) _ISdigit)
int isdigitImplFalsePositive(void) {
// If this code no longer produces a bug report, then consider removing the
// special case that disables buffer overflow reports coming from the isXXXXX
// macros in ctypes.h.
int c = getchar();
return ((*__ctype_b_loc ())[(int) (c)] & (unsigned short int) _ISdigit);
//expected-warning@-1 {{Potential out of bound access}}
}
int isdigitSuppressed(void) {
// Same code as above, but reports are suppressed based on macro name:
int c = getchar();
return isdigit(c); //no-warning
}
// Some later tests use isdigit as a function, so we need to undef it:
#undef isdigit
void testUncontrolledFormatString(char **p) {
char s[80];
fscanf(stdin, "%s", s);
char buf[128];
sprintf(buf,s); // expected-warning {{Uncontrolled Format String}}
setproctitle(s, 3); // expected-warning {{Uncontrolled Format String}}
// Test taint propagation through strcpy and family.
char scpy[80];
strcpy(scpy, s);
sprintf(buf,scpy); // expected-warning {{Uncontrolled Format String}}
stpcpy(*(++p), s); // this generates __inline.
setproctitle(*(p), 3); // expected-warning {{Uncontrolled Format String}}
char spcpy[80];
stpcpy(spcpy, s);
setproctitle(spcpy, 3); // expected-warning {{Uncontrolled Format String}}
char *spcpyret;
spcpyret = stpcpy(spcpy, s);
setproctitle(spcpyret, 3); // expected-warning {{Uncontrolled Format String}}
char sncpy[80];
strncpy(sncpy, s, 20);
setproctitle(sncpy, 3); // expected-warning {{Uncontrolled Format String}}
char *dup;
dup = strndup(s, 20);
setproctitle(dup, 3); // expected-warning {{Uncontrolled Format String}}
}
void testTaintSystemCall(void) {
char buffer[156];
char addr[128];
scanf("%s", addr);
system(addr); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
// Test that spintf transfers taint.
sprintf(buffer, "/bin/mail %s < /tmp/email", addr);
system(buffer); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
}
void testTaintSystemCall2(void) {
// Test that snpintf transfers taint.
char buffern[156];
char addr[128];
scanf("%s", addr);
__builtin_snprintf(buffern, 10, "/bin/mail %s < /tmp/email", addr);
// expected-warning@-1 {{'snprintf' will always be truncated; specified size is 10, but format string expands to at least 24}}
system(buffern); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
}
void testTaintSystemCall3(void) {
char buffern2[156];
int numt;
char addr[128];
scanf("%s %d", addr, &numt);
__builtin_snprintf(buffern2, numt, "/bin/mail %s < /tmp/email", "abcd");
system(buffern2); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
}
void testGets(void) {
char str[50];
gets(str);
system(str); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
}
void testGets_s(void) {
char str[50];
gets_s(str, 49);
system(str); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
}
void testTaintedBufferSize(void) {
size_t ts;
// The functions malloc, calloc, bcopy and memcpy are not taint sinks in the
// default config of GenericTaintChecker (because that would cause too many
// false positives).
// FIXME: We should generate warnings when a value passed to these functions
// is tainted and _can be very large_ (because that's exploitable). This
// functionality probably belongs to the checkers that do more detailed
// modeling of these functions (MallocChecker and CStringChecker).
scanf("%zd", &ts);
int *buf1 = (int*)malloc(ts*sizeof(int)); // warn here, ts is unbounded and tainted
char *dst = (char*)calloc(ts, sizeof(char)); // warn here, ts is unbounded tainted
bcopy(buf1, dst, ts); // no warning here, since the size of buf1, dst equals ts. Cannot overflow.
__builtin_memcpy(dst, buf1, (ts + 4)*sizeof(char)); // warn here, dst overflows (whatever the value of ts)
// If both buffers are trusted, do not issue a warning.
char *dst2 = (char*)malloc(ts*sizeof(char)); // warn here, ts in unbounded
strncat(dst2, dst, ts); // no-warning
}
#define AF_UNIX 1 /* local to host (pipes) */
#define AF_INET 2 /* internetwork: UDP, TCP, etc. */
#define AF_LOCAL AF_UNIX /* backward compatibility */
#define SOCK_STREAM 1
int socket(int, int, int);
size_t read(int, void *, size_t);
void testSocket(void) {
int sock;
char buffer[100];
sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
read(sock, buffer, 100);
execl(buffer, "filename", 0); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
sock = socket(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
read(sock, buffer, 100);
execl(buffer, "filename", 0); // no-warning
sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
// References to both buffer and &buffer as an argument should taint the argument
read(sock, &buffer, 100);
execl(buffer, "filename", 0); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
}
void testStruct(void) {
struct {
char buf[16];
int length;
} tainted;
char buffer[16];
int sock;
sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
read(sock, &tainted, sizeof(tainted));
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(tainted.length); // expected-warning {{YES }}
}
void testStructArray(void) {
struct {
int length;
} tainted[4];
char dstbuf[16], srcbuf[16];
int sock;
sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
__builtin_memset(srcbuf, 0, sizeof(srcbuf));
read(sock, &tainted[0], sizeof(tainted));
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(tainted[0].length); // expected-warning {{YES}}
__builtin_memset(&tainted, 0, sizeof(tainted));
read(sock, &tainted, sizeof(tainted));
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(tainted[0].length); // expected-warning {{YES}}
__builtin_memset(&tainted, 0, sizeof(tainted));
// If we taint element 1, we should not raise an alert on taint for element 0 or element 2
read(sock, &tainted[1], sizeof(tainted));
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(tainted[0].length); // expected-warning {{NO}}
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(tainted[2].length); // expected-warning {{NO}}
}
void testUnion(void) {
union {
int x;
char y[4];
} tainted;
char buffer[4];
int sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
read(sock, &tainted.y, sizeof(tainted.y));
// FIXME: overlapping regions aren't detected by isTainted yet
__builtin_memcpy(buffer, tainted.y, tainted.x);
}
int testDivByZero(void) {
int x;
scanf("%d", &x);
return 5/x; // expected-warning {{Division by a tainted value, possibly zero}}
}
int testTaintedDivFP(void) {
int x;
scanf("%d", &x);
if (!x)
return 0;
return 5/x; // x cannot be 0, so no tainted warning either
}
// Zero-sized VLAs.
void testTaintedVLASize(void) {
int x;
scanf("%d", &x);
int vla[x]; // expected-warning{{Declared variable-length array (VLA) has tainted (attacker controlled) size that can be 0 or negative}}
}
// Tainted-sanitized VLAs.
void testTaintedSanitizedVLASize(void) {
int x;
scanf("%d", &x);
if (x<1)
return;
int vla[x]; // no-warning
}
int testTaintedAllocaMem() {
char x;
void * p;
scanf("%c", &x);
p = __builtin_alloca(1);
__builtin_memcpy(p, &x, 1);
return 5 / *(char*)p; // expected-warning {{Division by a tainted value, possibly zero}}
}
int testTaintedMallocMem() {
char x;
void * p;
scanf("%c", &x);
p = malloc(1);
__builtin_memcpy(p, &x, 1);
return 5 / *(char*)p; // expected-warning {{Division by a tainted value, possibly zero}}
}
// This computation used to take a very long time.
#define longcmp(a,b,c) { \
a -= c; a ^= c; c += b; b -= a; b ^= (a<<6) | (a >> (32-b)); a += c; c -= b; c ^= b; b += a; \
a -= c; a ^= c; c += b; b -= a; b ^= a; a += c; c -= b; c ^= b; b += a; }
unsigned radar11369570_hanging(const unsigned char *arr, int l) {
unsigned a, b, c;
a = b = c = 0x9899e3 + l;
while (l >= 6) {
unsigned t;
scanf("%d", &t);
a += b;
a ^= a;
a += (arr[3] + ((unsigned) arr[2] << 8) + ((unsigned) arr[1] << 16) + ((unsigned) arr[0] << 24));
longcmp(a, t, c);
l -= 12;
}
return 5/a; // FIXME: Should be a "div by tainted" warning here.
}
// This computation used to take a very long time.
void complex_taint_queries(const int *p) {
int tainted = 0;
scanf("%d", &tainted);
// Make "tmp" tainted.
int tmp = tainted + tainted;
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(tmp); // expected-warning{{YES}}
// Make "tmp" SymExpr a lot more complicated by applying computation.
// This should balloon the symbol complexity.
tmp += p[0] + p[0];
tmp += p[1] + p[1];
tmp += p[2] + p[2];
clang_analyzer_dump_int(tmp); // expected-warning{{((((conj_}} symbol complexity: 8
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(tmp); // expected-warning{{YES}}
tmp += p[3] + p[3];
clang_analyzer_dump_int(tmp); // expected-warning{{(((((conj_}} symbol complexity: 10
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(tmp); // expected-warning{{NO}} 10 is already too complex to be traversed
tmp += p[4] + p[4];
tmp += p[5] + p[5];
tmp += p[6] + p[6];
tmp += p[7] + p[7];
tmp += p[8] + p[8];
tmp += p[9] + p[9];
tmp += p[10] + p[10];
tmp += p[11] + p[11];
tmp += p[12] + p[12];
tmp += p[13] + p[13];
tmp += p[14] + p[14];
tmp += p[15] + p[15];
// The SymExpr still holds the full history of the computation, yet, "isTainted" doesn't traverse the tree as the complexity is over the threshold.
clang_analyzer_dump_int(tmp);
// expected-warning@-1{{(((((((((((((((((conj_}} symbol complexity: 34
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(tmp); // expected-warning{{NO}} FIXME: Ideally, this should still result in "tainted".
// By making it even one step more complex, then it would hit the "max-symbol-complexity"
// threshold and the engine would cut the SymExpr and replace it by a new conjured symbol.
tmp += p[16];
clang_analyzer_dump_int(tmp); // expected-warning{{conj_}} symbol complexity: 1
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(tmp); // expected-warning{{NO}}
}
// Check that we do not assert of the following code.
int SymSymExprWithDiffTypes(void* p) {
int i;
scanf("%d", &i);
int j = (i % (int)(long)p);
return 5/j; // expected-warning {{Division by a tainted value, possibly zero}}
}
void constraintManagerShouldTreatAsOpaque(int rhs) {
int i;
scanf("%d", &i);
// This comparison used to hit an assertion in the constraint manager,
// which didn't handle NonLoc sym-sym comparisons.
if (i < rhs)
return;
if (i < rhs)
*(volatile int *) 0; // no-warning
}
int testSprintf_is_not_a_source(char *buf, char *msg) {
int x = sprintf(buf, "%s", msg); // no-warning
return 1 / x; // no-warning: 'sprintf' is not a taint source
}
int testSprintf_propagates_taint(char *buf, char *msg) {
scanf("%s", msg);
int x = sprintf(buf, "%s", msg); // propagate taint!
return 1 / x; // expected-warning {{Division by a tainted value, possibly zero}}
}
void test_wchar_apis_dont_propagate(const char *path) {
// strlen, wcslen, strnlen and alike intentionally don't propagate taint.
// See the details here: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/66086
// This isn't ideal, but this is only what we have now.
FILE *f = fopen(path, "r");
clang_analyzer_isTainted_charp((char*)f); // expected-warning {{YES}}
wchar_t wbuf[10];
fgetws(wbuf, sizeof(wbuf)/sizeof(*wbuf), f);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_wchar(*wbuf); // expected-warning {{YES}}
int n = wcslen(wbuf);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(n); // expected-warning {{NO}}
wchar_t dst[100] = L"ABC";
clang_analyzer_isTainted_wchar(*dst); // expected-warning {{NO}}
wcsncat(dst, wbuf, sizeof(wbuf)/sizeof(*wbuf));
clang_analyzer_isTainted_wchar(*dst); // expected-warning {{YES}}
int m = wcslen(dst);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(m); // expected-warning {{NO}}
}
int scanf_s(const char *format, ...);
int testScanf_s_(int *out) {
scanf_s("%d", out);
return 1 / *out; // expected-warning {{Division by a tainted value, possibly zero}}
}
#define _IO_FILE FILE
int _IO_getc(_IO_FILE *__fp);
int testUnderscoreIO_getc(_IO_FILE *fp) {
char c = _IO_getc(fp);
return 1 / c; // expected-warning {{Division by a tainted value, possibly zero}}
}
char *getcwd(char *buf, size_t size);
int testGetcwd(char *buf, size_t size) {
char *c = getcwd(buf, size);
return system(c); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
}
char *getwd(char *buf);
int testGetwd(char *buf) {
char *c = getwd(buf);
return system(c); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
}
ssize_t readlink(const char *path, char *buf, size_t bufsiz);
int testReadlink(char *path, char *buf, size_t bufsiz) {
ssize_t s = readlink(path, buf, bufsiz);
system(buf); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
// readlink never returns 0
return 1 / (s + 1); // expected-warning {{Division by a tainted value, possibly zero}}
}
ssize_t readlinkat(int dirfd, const char *pathname, char *buf, size_t bufsiz);
int testReadlinkat(int dirfd, char *path, char *buf, size_t bufsiz) {
ssize_t s = readlinkat(dirfd, path, buf, bufsiz);
system(buf); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
(void)(1 / dirfd); // arg 0 is not tainted
system(path); // arg 1 is not tainted
(void)(1 / bufsiz); // arg 3 is not tainted
// readlinkat never returns 0
return 1 / (s + 1); // expected-warning {{Division by a tainted value, possibly zero}}
}
char *get_current_dir_name(void);
int testGet_current_dir_name() {
char *d = get_current_dir_name();
return system(d); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
}
int gethostname(char *name, size_t len);
int testGethostname(char *name, size_t len) {
gethostname(name, len);
return system(name); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
}
int getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *restrict addr, socklen_t addrlen,
char *restrict host, socklen_t hostlen,
char *restrict serv, socklen_t servlen, int flags);
int testGetnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *restrict addr, socklen_t addrlen,
char *restrict host, socklen_t hostlen,
char *restrict serv, socklen_t servlen, int flags) {
getnameinfo(addr, addrlen, host, hostlen, serv, servlen, flags);
system(host); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
return system(serv); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
}
int getseuserbyname(const char *linuxuser, char **selinuxuser, char **level);
int testGetseuserbyname(const char *linuxuser, char **selinuxuser, char **level) {
getseuserbyname(linuxuser, selinuxuser, level);
system(selinuxuser[0]); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
return system(level[0]); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
}
typedef int gid_t;
int getgroups(int size, gid_t list[]);
int testGetgroups(int size, gid_t list[], bool flag) {
int result = getgroups(size, list);
if (flag)
return 1 / list[0]; // expected-warning {{Division by a tainted value, possibly zero}}
return 1 / (result + 1); // expected-warning {{Division by a tainted value, possibly zero}}
}
char *getlogin(void);
int testGetlogin() {
char *n = getlogin();
return system(n); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
}
int getlogin_r(char *buf, size_t bufsize);
int testGetlogin_r(char *buf, size_t bufsize) {
getlogin_r(buf, bufsize);
return system(buf); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
}
int fscanf_s(FILE *stream, const char *format, ...);
void testFscanf_s(const char *fname, int *d) {
FILE *f = fopen(fname, "r");
fscanf_s(f, "%d", d);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(*d); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
int fread(void *buffer, size_t size, size_t count, FILE *stream);
void testFread(const char *fname, int *buffer, size_t size, size_t count) {
FILE *f = fopen(fname, "r");
size_t read = fread(buffer, size, count, f);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(*buffer); // expected-warning {{YES}}
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(read); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
ssize_t recv(int sockfd, void *buf, size_t len, int flags);
int accept(int fd, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t *addrlen);
int bind(int fd, const struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen);
int listen(int fd, int backlog);
void testRecv(int *buf, size_t len, int flags) {
int fd;
scanf("%d", &fd); // fake a tainted a file descriptor
size_t read = recv(fd, buf, len, flags);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(*buf); // expected-warning {{YES}}
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(read); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
ssize_t recvfrom(int sockfd, void *restrict buf, size_t len, int flags,
struct sockaddr *restrict src_addr,
socklen_t *restrict addrlen);
void testRecvfrom(int *restrict buf, size_t len, int flags,
struct sockaddr *restrict src_addr,
socklen_t *restrict addrlen) {
int fd;
scanf("%d", &fd); // fake a tainted a file descriptor
size_t read = recvfrom(fd, buf, len, flags, src_addr, addrlen);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(*buf); // expected-warning {{YES}}
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(read); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
char *ttyname(int fd);
void testTtyname() {
int fd;
scanf("%d", &fd); // fake a tainted a file descriptor
char *name = ttyname(fd);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_charp(name); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
int ttyname_r(int fd, char *buf, size_t buflen);
void testTtyname_r(char *buf, size_t buflen) {
int fd;
scanf("%d", &fd); // fake a tainted a file descriptor
int result = ttyname_r(fd, buf, buflen);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_char(*buf); // expected-warning {{YES}}
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
char *dirname(char *path);
void testDirname() {
char buf[10];
scanf("%9s", buf);
char *name = dirname(buf);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_charp(name); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
char *basename(char *path);
void testBasename() {
char buf[10];
scanf("%9s", buf);
char *name = basename(buf);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_charp(name); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
int fnmatch(const char *pattern, const char *string, int flags);
void testFnmatch(const char *pattern, int flags) {
char string[10];
scanf("%9s", string);
int result = fnmatch(pattern, string, flags);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
void *memchr(const void *s, int c, size_t n);
void testMemchr(int c, size_t n) {
char buf[10];
scanf("%9s", buf);
char *result = memchr(buf, c, n);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_charp(result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
void *memrchr(const void *s, int c, size_t n);
void testMemrchr(int c, size_t n) {
char buf[10];
scanf("%9s", buf);
char *result = memrchr(buf, c, n);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_charp(result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
void *rawmemchr(const void *s, int c);
void testRawmemchr(int c) {
char buf[10];
scanf("%9s", buf);
char *result = rawmemchr(buf, c);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_charp(result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
int mbtowc(wchar_t *pwc, const char *s, size_t n);
void testMbtowc(wchar_t *pwc, size_t n) {
char buf[10];
scanf("%9s", buf);
int result = mbtowc(pwc, buf, n);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_char(*pwc); // expected-warning {{YES}}
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
int wctomb(char *s, wchar_t wc);
void testWctomb(char *buf) {
wchar_t wc = getchar();
int result = wctomb(buf, wc);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_char(*buf); // expected-warning {{YES}}
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
int wcwidth(wchar_t c);
void testWcwidth() {
wchar_t wc = getchar();
int width = wcwidth(wc);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(width); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
int memcmp(const void *s1, const void *s2, size_t n);
void testMemcmpWithLHSTainted(size_t n, char *rhs) {
char lhs[10];
scanf("%9s", lhs);
int cmp_result = memcmp(lhs, rhs, n);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(cmp_result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
void testMemcmpWithRHSTainted(size_t n, char *lhs) {
char rhs[10];
scanf("%9s", rhs);
int cmp_result = memcmp(lhs, rhs, n);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(cmp_result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
void *memcpy(void *restrict dest, const void *restrict src, size_t n);
void testMemcpy(char *dst, size_t n) {
char src[10];
scanf("%9s", src);
char *result = memcpy(dst, src, n);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_char(*dst); // expected-warning {{YES}}
clang_analyzer_isTainted_charp(result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n);
void testMemmove(char *dst, size_t n) {
char src[10];
scanf("%9s", src);
char *result = memmove(dst, src, n);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_char(*dst); // expected-warning {{YES}}
clang_analyzer_isTainted_charp(result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
void *memmem(const void *haystack, size_t haystacklen, const void *needle, size_t needlelen);
void testMemmem(const void *needle, size_t needlelen) {
char haystack[10];
scanf("%9s", haystack);
char *result = memmem(haystack, 9, needle, needlelen);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_charp(result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
char *strstr(const char *haystack, const char *needle);
void testStrstr(const char *needle) {
char haystack[10];
scanf("%9s", haystack);
char *result = strstr(haystack, needle);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_charp(result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
char *strcasestr(const char *haystack, const char *needle);
void testStrcasestr(const char *needle) {
char haystack[10];
scanf("%9s", haystack);
char *result = strcasestr(haystack, needle);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_charp(result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
char *strchrnul(const char *s, int c);
void testStrchrnul() {
char s[10];
scanf("%9s", s);
char *result = strchrnul(s, 9);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_charp(result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
char *index(const char *s, int c);
void testIndex() {
char s[10];
scanf("%9s", s);
char *result = index(s, 9);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_charp(result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
char *rindex(const char *s, int c);
void testRindex() {
char s[10];
scanf("%9s", s);
char *result = rindex(s, 9);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_charp(result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
int strcmp(const char *s1, const char *s2);
void testStrcmpWithLHSTainted(char *rhs) {
char lhs[10];
scanf("%9s", lhs);
int cmp_result = strcmp(lhs, rhs);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(cmp_result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
void testStrcmpWithRHSTainted(char *lhs) {
char rhs[10];
scanf("%9s", rhs);
int cmp_result = strcmp(lhs, rhs);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(cmp_result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
int strcasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2);
void testStrcasecmpWithLHSTainted(char *rhs) {
char lhs[10];
scanf("%9s", lhs);
int cmp_result = strcasecmp(lhs, rhs);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(cmp_result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
void testStrcasecmpWithRHSTainted(char *lhs) {
char rhs[10];
scanf("%9s", rhs);
int cmp_result = strcasecmp(lhs, rhs);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(cmp_result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
int strncmp(const char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n);
void testStrncmpWithLHSTainted(char *rhs, size_t n) {
char lhs[10];
scanf("%9s", lhs);
int cmp_result = strncmp(lhs, rhs, n);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(cmp_result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
void testStrncmpWithRHSTainted(char *lhs, size_t n) {
char rhs[10];
scanf("%9s", rhs);
int cmp_result = strncmp(lhs, rhs, n);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(cmp_result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
void testStrncmpWithNTainted(char *lhs, char *rhs) {
int n;
scanf("%d", &n);
int cmp_result = strncmp(lhs, rhs, n);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(cmp_result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
int strncasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n);
void testStrncasecmpWithLHSTainted(char *rhs, size_t n) {
char lhs[10];
scanf("%9s", lhs);
int cmp_result = strncmp(lhs, rhs, n);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(cmp_result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
void testStrncasecmpWithRHSTainted(char *lhs, size_t n) {
char rhs[10];
scanf("%9s", rhs);
int cmp_result = strncmp(lhs, rhs, n);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(cmp_result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
void testStrncasecmpWithNTainted(char *lhs, char *rhs) {
int n;
scanf("%d", &n);
int cmp_result = strncmp(lhs, rhs, n);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(cmp_result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
size_t strspn(const char *s, const char *accept);
void testStrspnFirstArgTainted(const char *accept) {
char s[10];
scanf("%9s", s);
size_t result = strspn(s, accept);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
void testStrspnSecondArgTainted(const char *s) {
char accept[10];
scanf("%9s", accept);
size_t result = strspn(s, accept);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
size_t strcspn(const char *s, const char *reject);
void testStrcspnFirstArgTainted(const char *reject) {
char s[10];
scanf("%9s", s);
size_t result = strcspn(s, reject);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
void testStrcspnSecondArgTainted(const char *s) {
char reject[10];
scanf("%9s", reject);
size_t result = strcspn(s, reject);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
char *strpbrk(const char *s, const char *accept);
void testStrpbrk(const char *accept) {
char s[10];
scanf("%9s", s);
char *result = strpbrk(s, accept);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_charp(result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
char *strndup(const char *s, size_t n);
void testStrndup(size_t n) {
char s[10];
scanf("%9s", s);
char *result = strndup(s, n);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_charp(result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
char *strdupa(const char *s);
void testStrdupa() {
char s[10];
scanf("%9s", s);
char *result = strdupa(s);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_charp(result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
char *strndupa(const char *s, size_t n);
void testStrndupa(size_t n) {
char s[10];
scanf("%9s", s);
char *result = strndupa(s, n);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_charp(result); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
size_t strlen(const char *s);
void testStrlen_dont_propagate() {
// strlen, wcslen, strnlen and alike intentionally don't propagate taint.
// See the details here: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/66086
// This isn't ideal, but this is only what we have now.
char s[10];
scanf("%9s", s);
size_t result = strlen(s);
// strlen propagating taint would bring in many false positives
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(result); // expected-warning {{NO}}
}
size_t strnlen(const char *s, size_t maxlen);
void testStrnlen_dont_propagate(size_t maxlen) {
// strlen, wcslen, strnlen and alike intentionally don't propagate taint.
// See the details here: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/66086
// This isn't ideal, but this is only what we have now.
char s[10];
scanf("%9s", s);
size_t result = strnlen(s, maxlen);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(result); // expected-warning {{NO}}
}
long strtol(const char *restrict nptr, char **restrict endptr, int base);
long long strtoll(const char *restrict nptr, char **restrict endptr, int base);
unsigned long int strtoul(const char *nptr, char **endptr, int base);
unsigned long long int strtoull(const char *nptr, char **endptr, int base);
void testStrtolVariants(char **restrict endptr, int base) {
char s[10];
scanf("%9s", s);
long result_l = strtol(s, endptr, base);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(result_l); // expected-warning {{YES}}
long long result_ll = strtoll(s, endptr, base);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(result_ll); // expected-warning {{YES}}
unsigned long result_ul = strtoul(s, endptr, base);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(result_ul); // expected-warning {{YES}}
unsigned long long result_ull = strtoull(s, endptr, base);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(result_ull); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
int isalnum(int c);
int isalpha(int c);
int isascii(int c);
int isblank(int c);
int iscntrl(int c);
int isdigit(int c);
int isgraph(int c);
int islower(int c);
int isprint(int c);
int ispunct(int c);
int isspace(int c);
int isupper(int c);
int isxdigit(int c);
void testIsFunctions() {
char c;
scanf("%c", &c);
int alnum = isalnum(c);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(alnum); // expected-warning {{YES}}
int alpha = isalpha(c);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(alpha); // expected-warning {{YES}}
int ascii = isascii(c);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(ascii); // expected-warning {{YES}}
int blank = isblank(c);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(blank); // expected-warning {{YES}}
int cntrl = iscntrl(c);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(cntrl); // expected-warning {{YES}}
int digit = isdigit(c);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(digit); // expected-warning {{YES}}
int graph = isgraph(c);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(graph); // expected-warning {{YES}}
int lower = islower(c);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(lower); // expected-warning {{YES}}
int print = isprint(c);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(print); // expected-warning {{YES}}
int punct = ispunct(c);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(punct); // expected-warning {{YES}}
int space = isspace(c);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(space); // expected-warning {{YES}}
int upper = isupper(c);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(upper); // expected-warning {{YES}}
int xdigit = isxdigit(c);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(xdigit); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
void qsort(void *base, size_t nmemb, size_t size, int (*compar)(const void *, const void *));
void qsort_r(void *base, size_t nmemb, size_t size, int (*compar)(const void *, const void *, void *), void *arg);
void testQsort() {
int data[1];
scanf("%d", data);
qsort(data, sizeof(data), sizeof(data[0]), NULL);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(data[0]); // expected-warning {{YES}}
qsort_r(data, sizeof(data), sizeof(data[0]), NULL, NULL);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(data[0]); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
// Test configuration
int mySource1(void);
void mySource2(int*);
void myScanf(const char*, ...);
int myPropagator(int, int*);
int mySnprintf(char*, size_t, const char*, ...);
bool isOutOfRange(const int*); // const filter function
void sanitizeCmd(char*); // non-const filter function
void mySink(int, int, int);
void testConfigurationSources1(void) {
int x = mySource1();
Buffer[x] = 1; // expected-warning {{Potential out of bound access }}
}
void testConfigurationSources2(void) {
int x;
mySource2(&x);
Buffer[x] = 1; // expected-warning {{Potential out of bound access }}
}
void testConfigurationSources3(void) {
int x, y;
myScanf("%d %d", &x, &y);
Buffer[y] = 1; // expected-warning {{Potential out of bound access }}
}
void testConfigurationPropagation(void) {
int x = mySource1();
int y;
myPropagator(x, &y);
Buffer[y] = 1; // expected-warning {{Potential out of bound access }}
}
void testConfigurationFilter(void) {
int x = mySource1();
if (isOutOfRange(&x)) // the filter function
return;
Buffer[x] = 1; // no-warning
}
void testConfigurationFilterNonConst(void) {
char buffer[1000];
myScanf("%s", buffer); // makes buffer tainted
system(buffer); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
}
void testConfigurationFilterNonConst2(void) {
char buffer[1000];
myScanf("%s", buffer); // makes buffer tainted
sanitizeCmd(buffer); // removes taintedness
system(buffer); // no-warning
}
void testConfigurationSinks(void) {
int x = mySource1();
mySink(x, 1, 2);
// expected-warning@-1 {{Untrusted data is passed to a user-defined sink}}
mySink(1, x, 2); // no-warning
mySink(1, 2, x);
// expected-warning@-1 {{Untrusted data is passed to a user-defined sink}}
}
int test_exec_like_functions() {
char buf[100] = {0};
scanf("%99s", buf);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_char(buf[0]); // expected-warning {{YES}}
char *cleanArray[] = {"ENV1=V1", "ENV2=V2", NULL};
char *taintedArray[] = {buf, "ENV2=V2", NULL};
clang_analyzer_isTainted_char(taintedArray[0][0]); // expected-warning {{YES}}
clang_analyzer_isTainted_char(*(char*)taintedArray[0]); // expected-warning {{YES}}
clang_analyzer_isTainted_char(*(char*)taintedArray); // expected-warning {{NO}} We should have YES here.
// FIXME: Above the triple pointer indirection will confuse the checker,
// as we only check two levels. The results would be worse, if the tainted
// subobject ("buf") would not be at the beginning of the enclosing object,
// for the same reason.
switch (coin()) {
default: break;
// Execute `path` with all arguments after `path` until a NULL pointer
// and environment from `environ'.
case 0: return execl("path", "arg0", "arg1", "arg2", NULL); // no-warning
case 1: return execl(buf, "arg0", "arg1", "arg2", NULL); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
case 2: return execl("path", buf, "arg1", "arg2", NULL); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
case 3: return execl("path", "arg0", buf, "arg2", NULL); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
case 4: return execl("path", "arg0", "arg1", buf, NULL); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
}
switch (coin()) {
default: break;
// Execute `path` with all arguments after `PATH` until a NULL pointer,
// and the argument after that for environment.
case 0: return execle("path", "arg0", "arg1", NULL, cleanArray); // no-warning
case 1: return execle( buf, "arg0", "arg1", NULL, cleanArray); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
case 2: return execle("path", buf, "arg1", NULL, cleanArray); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
case 3: return execle("path", "arg0", buf, NULL, cleanArray); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
case 4: return execle("path", "arg0", "arg1", NULL, buf); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
case 5: return execle("path", "arg0", "arg1", NULL, taintedArray); // FIXME: We might wanna have a report here.
}
switch (coin()) {
default: break;
// Execute `file`, searching in the `PATH' environment variable if it
// contains no slashes, with all arguments after `file` until a NULL
// pointer and environment from `environ'.
case 0: return execlp("file", "arg0", "arg1", "arg2", NULL); // no-warning
case 1: return execlp( buf, "arg0", "arg1", "arg2", NULL); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
case 2: return execlp("file", buf, "arg1", "arg2", NULL); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
case 3: return execlp("file", "arg0", buf, "arg2", NULL); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
case 4: return execlp("file", "arg0", "arg1", buf, NULL); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
}
switch (coin()) {
default: break;
// Execute `path` with arguments `ARGV` and environment from `environ'.
case 0: return execv("path", /*argv=*/ cleanArray); // no-warning
case 1: return execv( buf, /*argv=*/ cleanArray); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
case 2: return execv("path", /*argv=*/taintedArray); // FIXME: We might wanna have a report here.
}
switch (coin()) {
default: break;
// Replace the current process, executing `path` with arguments `ARGV`
// and environment `ENVP`. `ARGV` and `ENVP` are terminated by NULL pointers.
case 0: return execve("path", /*argv=*/ cleanArray, /*envp=*/cleanArray); // no-warning
case 1: return execve( buf, /*argv=*/ cleanArray, /*envp=*/cleanArray); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
case 2: return execve("path", /*argv=*/taintedArray, /*envp=*/cleanArray); // FIXME: We might wanna have a report here.
case 3: return execve("path", /*argv=*/cleanArray, /*envp=*/taintedArray); // FIXME: We might wanna have a report here.
}
switch (coin()) {
default: break;
// Execute `file`, searching in the `PATH' environment variable if it
// contains no slashes, with arguments `ARGV` and environment from `environ'.
case 0: return execvp("file", /*argv=*/ cleanArray); // no-warning
case 1: return execvp( buf, /*argv=*/ cleanArray); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
case 2: return execvp("file", /*argv=*/taintedArray); // FIXME: We might wanna have a report here.
}
// execvpe
switch (coin()) {
default: break;
// Execute `file`, searching in the `PATH' environment variable if it
// contains no slashes, with arguments `ARGV` and environment `ENVP`.
// `ARGV` and `ENVP` are terminated by NULL pointers.
case 0: return execvpe("file", /*argv=*/ cleanArray, /*envp=*/ cleanArray); // no-warning
case 1: return execvpe( buf, /*argv=*/ cleanArray, /*envp=*/ cleanArray); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
case 2: return execvpe("file", /*argv=*/taintedArray, /*envp=*/ cleanArray); // FIXME: We might wanna have a report here.
case 3: return execvpe("file", /*argv=*/ cleanArray, /*envp=*/taintedArray); // FIXME: We might wanna have a report here.
}
int cleanFD = coin();
int taintedFD;
scanf("%d", &taintedFD);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(taintedFD); // expected-warning {{YES}}
switch (coin()) {
default: break;
// Execute the file `FD` refers to, overlaying the running program image.
// `ARGV` and `ENVP` are passed to the new program, as for `execve'.
case 0: return fexecve( cleanFD, /*argv=*/ cleanArray, /*envp=*/ cleanArray); // no-warning
case 1: return fexecve(taintedFD, /*argv=*/ cleanArray, /*envp=*/ cleanArray); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
case 2: return fexecve( cleanFD, /*argv=*/taintedArray, /*envp=*/ cleanArray); // FIXME: We might wanna have a report here.
case 3: return fexecve( cleanFD, /*argv=*/ cleanArray, /*envp=*/taintedArray); // FIXME: We might wanna have a report here.
}
switch (coin()) {
default: break;
// Create a new stream connected to a pipe running the given `command`.
case 0: return pclose(popen("command", /*mode=*/"r")); // no-warning
case 1: return pclose(popen( buf, /*mode=*/"r")); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
case 2: return pclose(popen("command", /*mode=*/buf)); // 'mode' is not a taint sink.
}
switch (coin()) {
default: break;
// Execute the given line as a shell command.
case 0: return system("command"); // no-warning
case 1: return system( buf); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a system call}}
}
return 0;
}
void testUnknownFunction(void (*foo)(void)) {
foo(); // no-crash
}
void testProctitleFalseNegative(void) {
char flag[80];
fscanf(stdin, "%79s", flag);
char *argv[] = {"myapp", flag};
// FIXME: We should have a warning below: Untrusted data passed to sink.
setproctitle_init(1, argv, 0);
}
void testProctitle2(char *real_argv[]) {
char *app = getenv("APP_NAME");
if (!app)
return;
char *argv[] = {app, "--foobar"};
setproctitle_init(1, argv, 0); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a user-defined sink}}
setproctitle_init(1, real_argv, argv); // expected-warning {{Untrusted data is passed to a user-defined sink}}
}
void testAcceptPropagates() {
int listenSocket = socket(2, 1, 6);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(listenSocket); // expected-warning {{YES}}
int acceptSocket = accept(listenSocket, 0, 0);
clang_analyzer_isTainted_int(acceptSocket); // expected-warning {{YES}}
}
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